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Knowledge-Based Issues for Aid 
Agencies in Crisis Scenarios:
Evolving from Impediments to Trust
ABSTRACT
As part of its expanding role, particularly as an agent of peace building, the United Nations (UN) actively 
participates in the implementation of measures to prevent and manage crisis/disaster situations. The 
purpose of such an approach is to empower the victims, protect the environment, rebuild communities, 
and create employment. However, real world crisis management situations are complex given the mul-
tiple interrelated interests, actors, relations, and objectives. Recent studies in healthcare contexts, which 
also have dynamic and complex operations, have shown the merit and benefits of employing various 
tools and techniques from the domain of knowledge management (KM). Hence, this paper investigates 
three distinct natural crisis situations (the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, the 2004 Boxing Day Asian Tsunami, 
and the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake) with which the United Nations and international aid agencies have 
been and are currently involved, to identify recurring issues which continue to provide knowledge-based 
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations (UN) is an international or-
ganization that was founded in 1945 to maintain 
global peace and security. Since its inception, the 
UN has expanded its role. These additional roles 
relate to developing friendly relations, promoting 
social progress, elevation to higher standards of 
living and better living standards, and uphold-
ing human rights (United Nations, 2010). In 
1994 the UN introduced the concept of human 
security as part of the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 1994). The report was published 
in an effort to commend the virtues of sustain-
able human development which not only gener-
ates economic growth, but also promotes equal 
distribution of benefits to those worst affected by 
the crisis (UNDP, 1994). The purpose of such an 
approach is to empower the victims, protect the 
environment, rebuild communities, and create 
employment (UNDP, 1994). This concept was 
born out of a need to react to the changing ele-
ments of crisis situations and includes new security 
threats, international failures, civilian impact, a 
lack of preventative measures, globalization, and 
international advocacy (Comprehensive Crisis 
Management, 2008).
In recent years, and in accordance with human 
security, the UN has directed its focus away from 
peacekeeping and more towards peace building 
(Benner et al., 2007). With respect to this, the UN 
has looked to implement preventative measures 
in order to avoid crises. Crisis management can 
be multi-faceted and involves the prevention of 
crises, the development of preparedness mea-
sures, the course of relief and recovery, and the 
identification of a redevelopment process in the 
crisis aftermath.
This paper will discuss the efficacy of con-
temporary KM for crisis scenarios, the need for 
increased (associated) information sharing, greater 
teamwork and reduced duplication of effort. Fi-
nally, the paper lists a number of impediments that 
need to be broken down before a knowledge-based 
solution can be developed.
THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF CRISES
The crisis management cycle is best captured by 
a schematic which shows the severity of the each 
incidence against a given timeline, plotting all 
contributing factors in a pre and post-crisis situa-
tion (see Figure 1). The curve also identifies when 
weak signals are felt and any escalation into early 
warning signs thereafter; culminating in full-blown 
crisis which needs management to contain and/or 
minimize resultant impacts on society. Other work 
(Jennex & Raman, 2009) has described crises as 
a series of four phases: situational analysis (SA), 
initial response (IR), crisis response (ER), and 
recovery response (RR); and five decision/hand off 
points: the initiating event (IE), the control event 
(CE), the restoration event (RE), the normalizing 
event (NE), and a terminating event (TE).
CHALLENGE
When society discovers a priori signals that can 
lead to crisis, then the governing authority reacts 
through preventive diplomacy to return order to 
the system if the crisis is manmade. If the crisis is 
natural, then society instigates preventive strate-
gies, i.e., building earthquake proof buildings, 
tsunami resistant coastlines, etc. These preventive 
steps may minimize loss of life and damage to 
impediments. Major findings from each case study are analyzed according to the estimated impact of 
identified impediments. The severity of the enumerated knowledge-based issues is quantified and com-
pared by means of an assigned qualitative to identify the most significant attribute.
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property whilst ensuring that day-to-day activi-
ties continue as unaffected by change as possible. 
This ideal situation is seldom achieved; rather 
than being proactive, society is usually reactive, 
resulting in ineffective and inefficient responses 
to crisis situations in most instances. Many major 
crises have been experienced over time; such major 
crises attract a multitude of aid agencies hoping 
to provide assistance and alleviate suffering for 
those worst affected by such situations. This 
mass influx of agencies can often add further 
complexity to an already difficult situation. Lack 
of ownership, trust, coordination, communication, 
and knowledge transfer between international 
aid agencies, International Inter-governmental 
Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) can often be complicated 
or nonexistent: as a result the entire mission can 
be compromised.
Aid agencies and NGOs play vital roles in 
managing such crisis situations. Inadvertently 
they may conceal information which they regard 
as insignificant which is in fact vital to another 
stakeholder within the crisis domain. Without 
necessary systems, ownership and trust being 
in place, opportunity to provide appropriate aid 
may be severely hampered. Furthermore the clar-
ity of an agency’s role within a crisis situation 
can often be ambiguous and undefined. With no 
clear definition as to what they are attempting 
to achieve, and without the necessary guidance, 
problems can become apparent. The identification 
of clear leadership, coordination, and trust between 
organizations is of paramount importance: as 
such the ability to measure performance of vital 
importance.
This paper intends to investigate real-world 
crisis management situations with which the 
United Nations have been, and are currently in-
volved, in an attempt to identify recurring issues 
with these knowledge-based impediments. In 
particular, this paper presents three distinct natural 
crisis situations – the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, the 
2004 Boxing Day Asian Tsunami, and the 2001 
Gujarat Earthquake. These crisis situations have 
been presented as cases and thus selected due to 
their time periods and geographical dispersion. 
The cases underline ongoing problems apparent 
Figure 1. Crisis and disaster management curve (adapted from Immonen et al., 2009)
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in each situation and which show little sign of 
mitigation. Particular focus is placed on the UN’s 
role as a coordinating body during the crises. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates generic issues and their linkages 
for crises; it identifies major barriers that impede 
organizations like the UN, IGOs, NGOs and the 
state from delivering peace and human security.
There are four layers enumerated in Figure 2: 
the upper layer (layer one) identifies the situation 
as currently identified; elements of the layer 
contain risk, crisis, and post-crisis elements but 
are so entangled as to provide seamless transition 
between elements. This layer also highlights that 
there is currently little value placed upon imple-
Figure 2. Crisis management - current and desired situation
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menting measures of preparedness. Layer two 
identifies the impediments to knowledge sharing 
in a crisis situation:
• Trust, Leadership, and Ownership: A 
lack of, or poor implementation of, any of 
these elements can be detrimental to crisis 
management situations.
• Donors: Stipulations and guidelines laid 
out by donors as to where finance is dis-
tributed can prevent organizations from 
sharing data.
• Religion: Long-standing feuds based upon 
religious beliefs can make it difficult for 
organizations to openly share information.
• Political Factions: Interstate feuding and 
organizational disagreements can promote 
a reluctance to share information. This may 
be particularly apparent where a state is re-
quired to reveal information which may be 
highly secretive, or cause embarrassment 
to the state in question.
• Fears of revealing information which 
may be valuable to the organization: As 
has been witnessed in the Human Genome 
Project, many organizations have uncov-
ered valuable information which they have 
then been unwilling to reveal. This may be 
as a result of future opportunities to use the 
acquired knowledge to generate revenue 
streams.
• Loss of Power: High ranking IGOs and 
NGOs may feel their power base is weak-
ened due to sharing knowledge. By reveal-
ing information they possess, other orga-
nizations can find themselves on an equal 
footing.
• Organizational Culture: If the IGO or 
NGO lacks a culture of knowledge sharing 
it is unlikely to advocate this change.
Layer three highlights the gaps which are 
caused as a direct result of these impediments 
to knowledge sharing. Such knowledge gaps are 
widened by a lack of coordination, duplicated 
efforts, lost or undelivered supplies and services, 
and the urge of organizations to work indepen-
dently. The fourth layer describes the desirable 
situation. When knowledge gaps are bridged and 
impediments removed, then basic components for 
development, peace, and human security will be 
acquired cyclically. In addition, when the final 
layer is fulfilled, given organizations will be able 
to identify risks and weak signals at the beginning 
of the Crisis and Disaster Management Curve 
(Immonen et al., 2009) presented earlier and hence 
put in place measures of preparedness (Raman & 
Jennex, 2010). However, the aforementioned desir-
able final layer is hardly ever reached. The reasons 
behind this ineffective approach can be attributed 
to a number of factors. The next section outlines 
three cases to enumerate these knowledge-based 
issues and the impediments that have negatively 
impacted crisis and post-crisis situations.
CASE 1: HAITI EARTHQUAKE, 2010
On 12th January 2010 an earthquake of magnitude 
7.0 struck the Haitian capital of Port au Prince. 
The quake left up to 230,000 people dead, and 
another 200,000 injured. Additionally, up to a 
million people were left homeless (Bilham, 2010). 
Six months on from the disaster those affected 
continue to be in dire need of support, and the 
aid process has been heavily criticized in many 
quarters. This case study aims to understand the 
issues which have made the delivery of aid so dif-
ficult. The arrival of aid to Haiti was prompt and 
abundant. However, this created its own problems. 
Due to a lack of preparedness the arrival of aid 
was described as incredibly disorganized (BBC 
News, 2010). As increasing numbers of aid agen-
cies arrived bringing with them drastically-needed 
supplies, vital equipment was left sitting next to 
the runway for a number of days. In the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster when healthcare equip-
152
Knowledge-Based Issues for Aid Agencies in Crisis Scenarios
ment was most needed, a lack of organization 
disrupted its distribution.
Médecins Sans Frontières complained of de-
lays to supplies arriving at the expense of foreign 
troops. GOAL blamed the UN and USA for the 
delay, claiming it was their failure to work together 
which caused such disruption. The UN responded 
by blaming what it termed as underestimated lo-
gistical problems (BBC News, 2010). One of the 
reasons behind some of the chaotic beginnings 
to the aid situation can be attributed to a loss of 
personnel and systems belonging to the UN during 
the earthquake. The Inter Agency Standards Com-
mittee (IASC), however, who produced a report 
on the disaster in July 2010 criticized the early 
lack of co-ordination whilst praising subsequent 
efforts to improve this. The report also went on 
to describe the following issues (Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee, 2010):
• The need to work more proactively with 
the various actors involved and with local 
governments,
• The need for aid agencies to identify the 
necessary expertise, tools, knowledge and 
partnerships to operate effectively,
• A need to improve communications with 
disaster-affected populations,
• A need for strong, decisive, and empow-
ered leadership,
• The need for a shared strategic vision,
• The loss of information due to the earth-
quake was unrecoverable,
• The lack of coordination of over 400 hu-
manitarian groups,
• A lack of information on national 
capacities,
• A lack of preparedness on the part of the 
Haitian government and the UN,
• No exit strategy,
• The delay in the collection and sharing of 
information between agencies,
• A lack of willingness of agencies to priori-
ties the need for information sharing, and
• The lack of an accepted system by which to 
record and share information.
The IASC reserves its biggest criticism in its 
report for the lack of leadership and organization 
displayed, highlighting the lack of coordination 
between aid agencies in the early stages. This is 
blamed upon the high number of independent 
agencies involved and the shortage of available 
information. However, the report goes on to 
suggest that the cluster approach taken towards 
the development enabled communication to 
significantly improve. The report also highlights 
the failure of some aid agencies to engage with 
the authorities, hence restricting their strategic 
effectiveness. Furthermore, other organizations 
were hampered by their inability to access and 
thus benefit from the knowledge-based possessed 
by these agencies (Inter-Agency Standing Com-
mittee, 2010).
IASC identifies two barriers to inter-organiza-
tional knowledge sharing; one being the language 
barrier, the other a restricted access to coordina-
tion centers’ headquarters (Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee, 2010). In addition, incompatible sys-
tems may have prevented agencies from working 
together effectively. The report further highlights 
the failure of inexperienced, well intentioned agen-
cies to share and coordinate relief operations. A 
report carried out by the Disaster Accountability 
Project on aid agencies working in Haiti was 
also highly critical of the lack of transparency 
displayed. Of 200 organizations interviewed only 
6 regularly provided factual updated reports (Di-
saster Accountability Project, 2010). This report 
calls for increased transparency in all aid agencies 
in order to ensure accountability and monitoring, 
and proposed that that policies should be put in 
place as a matter of course to ensure the enforce-
ment of such guidelines. Disaster Accountability 
Project (2010) blames many of the problems on 
ineffective coordination strategies. Such problems 
may have been caused by the sheer scale of such 
a relief effort.
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CASE 2: BOXING DAY 
ASIAN TSUNAMI, 2004
On December 26th 2004 an earthquake of mag-
nitude 9.0 struck 250 km off the coast of the 
Indonesian city of Banda Aceh (Pickrell, 2005). 
The subsequent tsunami caused substantial dam-
age to towns and cities in thirteen countries as far 
away as Somalia. The death toll was estimated to 
be around 225,000 with a further 500,000 injured. 
An additional 150,000 people were killed by the 
resultant spread of infectious disease (Pickrell, 
2005). The subsequent after effects of the disaster 
left five million homeless and a further one mil-
lion unable to make a living. The estimated total 
cost of the disaster was placed at approximately 
$7.5 billion.
Such previously unprecedented geographical 
dispersion of the disaster made the distribution 
of effective aid a near impossible prospect and 
proved a huge drain on resources, particularly to 
large organizations like the UN. Takeda and Helms 
(2006) discussed how the United Nations Disaster 
Relief Agency managed the situation and argued 
that the highly bureaucratic system employed 
for disaster preparedness actually added to the 
complexity of the disaster relief efforts due to its 
failure to include any scope for adaptability. The 
same authors argue that a system was in place to 
coordinate the work of NGOs and aid agencies 
under the UN umbrella (Takeda & Helms, 2006) 
and argue that the rational approach employed 
by these systems is unworkable in an irrational 
situation. They additionally call for the use of a 
more fluid system capable of changing according 
to the needs of the situation (a holistic manage-
ment system). They state their belief that, whilst 
management information systems are vital for 
sharing information, in an ever-changing world, 
it is equally important that these systems are fluid 
and adapt to change. In addition to the problems 
with the systems employed by the UN, a number 
of other impediments to the delivery of aid have 
been identified. Table 1 highlights some of these 
issues (grouped according to source).
Table 1. Impediments to the delivery of aid 
Issue Source
• Slowness in arranging meetings 
• The under preparedness of the states to deal with disaster 
• An insufficient supply of external information 
• A refusal of some organizations to accept outside help
Takeda and Helms (2006)
• Some NGOs operated independently making coordination more complex 
• Arriving UN staff had little understanding of countries or cultures 
• A lack of information flow resulted in a duplication of efforts 
• Information was available but inaccessible to those who needed it 
• The language barrier 
• Inexperienced NGOs were unaware of the need to coordinate with other actors
UN (2005)
• A failure on the parts of governments and aid agencies to work in close proximity 
• Refusal of Indian government to allow access to the Andaman Islands due to military sensitivity
BBC News (2006)
• Aid being delivered to the same spot twice whilst others were left desperately waiting unattended 
• Conflicting directions being given by differing sources
Gonsalves (2005)
• A lack of infrastructure with an uncoordinated response to the arrival of aid agencies CNN (2005)
• No adequate distribution system resulted in goods and supplies waiting at airport Paddock and Magnier (2004)
• Government protocols prevented access to certain countries or areas Takeda and Helms (2005)
• Numbers of refugees in camps were inflated by government officials in order to gain greater levels of 
aid
Solomon and Higgins (2005)
154
Knowledge-Based Issues for Aid Agencies in Crisis Scenarios
Despite the reported problems highlighted, the 
general consensus as to the relief efforts experi-
enced following the tsunami is largely positive, 
which has resulted in a belief that much has been 
learnt from the situations encountered (Shaw et 
al., 2010). However, some reports suggest that 
similar errors to those made during the tsunami 
relief effort are still being made today. This indi-
cates that mistakes are not being appropriately 
engineered out of the relative organizations’ relief 
strategies.
In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami the 
UN elected to set up Humanitarian Information 
Centers (HICs) which contained information on 
ownership, maps, surveys, meetings and funding. 
The HIC was largely considered a success and 
currently remains operable in some affected coun-
tries. One point of note which has arisen from the 
UN’s work in Indonesia is the reported change in 
relationship between the UN and NGOs. Whereas 
previously NGOs acted as a ‘sub-contractor’ to 
the UN, increasingly NGO funding has changed 
the dynamic. The UNDP reports one NGO asking 
the UN to carry out work on their behalf (UNDP, 
2005). This blurring of established relationships 
sets a precedent which could compromise the UN’s 
ability to influence government policy making. 
The UNDP also reports success in collaborations 
between Islamic and Western NGOs (UNDP, 
2005) which had previously been an area of much 
sensitivity. The mass geographic dispersion of aid 
agencies during the tsunami relief effort created 
unprecedented problems for the UN in coordinat-
ing an efficient response.
CASE 3: GUJARAT 
EARTHQUAKE, 2001
On January 26th 2001 a major earthquake measur-
ing 6.9 on the Richter scale struck the Western 
Indian state of Gujarat. Reports suggested the 
earthquake killed in excess of 20,000 people and 
left a further 165,000 injured. Over 16 million 
people were affected by the disaster which left 
around 7,000 homes destroyed (BBC News, 2001). 
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, relief 
work was largely undertaken by bilateral agencies 
and NGOs. UNDAC (United Nations Disaster 
and Co-ordination) reported nearly 250 agencies 
were active in the region by February. The UN 
response to the disaster was relatively minor, with 
the organization endeavoring to develop a coor-
dination centre. The centre became operational 
a week after the initial disaster, which, by the 
UN’s own concession proved largely ineffective; 
the UN also confesses that the team sent was 
largely ill-equipped and insignificant (Harland 
& Wahlstrom, 2001).
The UN also highlights a lack of clarity in the 
role which each division within the organization 
should be undertaking, resulting in poor relations 
between divisions. This in turn led to external 
organizations and NGOs expressing their disap-
pointment at the UN’s input and their failure to 
coordinate a response to the crisis (Harland & 
Wahlstrom, 2001). The DEC (Disaster Emergency 
Committee) reported well-established NGOs had 
long-standing uncomfortable relations with the 
UN. The resultant effect of this situation was that 
most NGOs were relying on the UN to coordinate 
operations, but believed that they failed to in this 
task. As a result the UN and other organizations 
operating at the scene were accused of being 
‘weak, slow, and lacking in direction’; the UN 
itself was accused of absorbing lots of information 
but delivering little in return and of acting in an 
‘elitist’ manner (Harland & Wahlstrom, 2001).
More worryingly for the UN was the view 
taken by many that the organization was a group 
of disparate agencies, each responsible for doing 
its own thing. This lack of collaboration and failure 
to work together significantly hindered the UN 
response. The lack of information flow in place 
during the disaster resulted in further problems. 
The UN reports that its divisions were reliant upon 
UNICEF’s experience in the region to provide 
contacts and information regarding how to operate 
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in Gujarat. Logistical and administrative support, 
along with a supply of information, was left des-
perately lacking (Harland & Wahlstrom, 2001).
A distinct lack of management capacity and 
good relations with the Indian government further 
hampered attempts to develop successful strate-
gies. This was attributed to India’s longstanding 
directive of managing disasters internally. The 
result was a slow response by the UN to the disaster 
and a subsequent lack of information sharing be-
tween the state and the UN. A slow response to the 
disaster and the UN’s late entry into the situation 
resulted in UN departments being forced to spend 
much of the early days catching up. Harland and 
Wahlstrom (2001) reiterated the need for leaders 
to be appointed and how fast they should respond 
to a given crisis situation: “Leadership can only be 
provided if the aspiring leader is the first on-site”.
Failure to produce field reports was put down to 
a problem in centralized decision making. Various 
UN agencies in the field failed to agree upon whose 
views the report should include, thus causing fur-
ther in-fighting. Geneva (the UN Headquarters) 
failed to rectify this situation which, as a result, 
was allowed to perpetuate, further hampering the 
relief effort (Harland & Wahlstrom, 2001). The 
UNDAC systems used by the UN during the di-
saster to disseminate information were generally 
regarded functioning to an acceptable level whilst 
being made available to all relevant actors within 
the crisis domain. Nevertheless it is iterated that 
a system is only as good as its users and the input 
they provide. As such, the system was criticized 
for being user unfriendly (Harland & Wahlstrom, 
2001). As is apparent, criticisms of the UN were 
abundant. However, NGOs, the state and other 
actors were also responsible for a number of 
problems which are presented in Table 2.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
This section provides an analysis of the case stud-
ies discussed previously, commencing with major 
findings from each, supplemented by discussion 
regarding the cause and effect of various impedi-
ments. Each impediment will be assigned a level 
of severity as to the problems it caused during 
each situation; this section will additionally align 
impediments with the effects created to highlight 
those which generated the most problems.
Leadership, Trust, and Ownership
A significant lack of leadership, trust and owner-
ship is apparent in all of the case studies analyzed. 
Table 2. Problems of NGOs 
Issue Source
• A lack of experience, partnerships, and relationships with other actors 
• A lack of a strategic plan, or exit strategy 
• A lack of clarity as to the actors’ roles within the situation 
• NGOs created disparate communities who shared information only between themselves due to 
the UN’s failure to make central decisions 
• Mistakes made during previous disasters were repeated 
• Failures on the part of the UN to heed lessons learnt in previous scenarios and apply them to 
new situations
Harland and Wahlstrom (2001)
• A failure by the Indian government to provide the necessary information 
• A lack of preparedness by all sides to respond in an area prone to natural disasters 
• Weak assessments of the damage inflicted 
• A failure to engage with local communities during rebuilding
Shah (2002)
• Failure to develop effective local partnerships 
• Duplication of efforts
Disasters Emergency Committee 
(2001)
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In Haiti, particularly during the early phases of 
the relief effort, there were a number of reports to 
suggest that leadership was an issue: many were 
highly critical and blamed a lack of leadership 
for the problems which arose during the first few 
weeks. The concerns with leadership identified 
during the Haiti situation, and indeed the other case 
studies analyzed, were exasperated by the huge 
influx of aid agencies who attended the disaster. 
This provided significant problems with effective 
coordination and engagement. There were also 
elements concerning trust during the Haiti situa-
tion, evidenced by the refusal of the UN to allow 
access to its command headquarters.
Leadership proved problematic during the 
tsunami, in large part due to the vast geographi-
cal dispersion of the disaster compounded by a 
need for the UN to operate in a different manner 
in the various affected countries. The Indonesian 
government, for example, requested that the UN 
take responsibility for the aid, and close ties with 
the Sri Lankan government were also established. 
In other countries the UN has to operate under 
state government legislation. The main criticisms 
leveled at the UN concerning leadership were fo-
cused upon the lack of, and slowness in, arranging 
regular meetings in order to gauge process and 
coordination of effort. The Gujarat earthquake 
provides the most compelling evidence of how 
poor leadership can influence the outcome of 
crisis situations. The relief program experienced 
massive problems which threatened to undermine 
the entire effort and seriously damage aid agency 
relations. The study highlights failures of the 
UN in establishing good governance, effective 
leadership and ownership of the crisis situation. 
Not only was leadership of other organizations 
exposed; the study also demonstrated significant 
issues in ownership and leadership within the 
UN’s own departments.
Alongside ownership and leadership, the study 
showed that centralized decision-making can be 
considerably damaging to a project, and seriously 
delay decisions and impede information flows. 
The cases also demonstrate the issues which can 
become apparent if relations between the state and 
the UN become strained where outright ownership 
of the situation is not established. The element of 
trust between the UN and other organizations can 
play a pivotal role in delivering aid in a timely 
manner. Aid agencies accused the UN of absorb-
ing much information and delivering little, fail-
ing to achieve what was expected of them. This 
had the effect of forcing aid agencies to operate 
independently and create disparate communities. 
The recent Chilean earthquake has highlighted 
the benefits of good governance during crisis 
situations where government then swiftly took 
ownership of the problem, largely refusing help 
from various aid agencies.
The effects of a lack of leadership, trust, and 
ownership had underlying implications for the 
relief efforts and significantly hampered the de-
livery of aid in all of the case studies analyzed. 
Aid agencies were often forced to repeat work 
already accomplished, with reports suggesting 
aid was delivered more than once to the same 
location. The lack of leadership and ownership 
again highlights how poor coordination forced 
aid agencies to act under their own recognizance. 
This was caused by a failure to provide regular 
meetings and, therefore, a knowledge base for 
sharing information across agencies. A failure 
to provide leadership also badly affected the op-
portunity to develop any form of strategic plan. 
Therefore agencies had little to no clarity as to 
their specific role and no opportunity to monitor 
or evaluate performances. The need for effective 
leadership was further exaggerated by the vast 
number of aid agencies drawn to the crisis.
Under Preparedness
One of the most important findings from the Haiti 
case study was the under-preparedness of the aid 
organizations in dealing with a crisis in this area. 
With Haiti being highly prone to a series of natural 
disasters, including hurricanes and earthquakes, 
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one would expect aid agencies to have some level 
of infrastructure permanently set up in this area. 
In addition, the preparedness of the Haitian state 
has been criticized for its failings to instigate the 
necessary measures for such predictable crises. 
Although the UN tragically reported losing person-
nel and systems during the earthquake, the failure 
to back-up data and to share knowledge among aid 
workers considerably hampered the effort. This 
illustrates the UN’s failure to become a learning 
organization and disseminate knowledge gained 
in the field.
Evidence of under preparedness is also ap-
parent during the tsunami case study. In addition 
to criticisms being leveled predominantly at aid 
agencies, the states involved have been largely con-
demned for their lack of preparedness, insufficient 
infrastructure and slowness to respond. However, 
the UN has not been exempt from criticism with 
attending staff admitting to having little knowl-
edge of the culture and values of the countries to 
which they were seconded. The unprecedented 
geographical dispersion of the tsunami provides 
some mitigation as to the unpreparedness of the UN 
response. Nevertheless, it is feasible to expect that 
the UN would have greater preparatory measures 
in certain affected regions. Furthermore, the lack 
of cultural awareness of UN staff can be largely 
attributed to insufficient training and sharing of 
regional knowledge. State awareness remains a 
difficult area to quantify. The majority of the 
thirteen nations affected were criticized in some 
quarters for their slow and ineffective response 
to the disasters. Whilst national preparedness is 
largely the remit of the state, it appears there is 
scope for the UN to become involved with some 
form of training or preparation scheme to help 
states deal with disasters.
The Gujarat earthquake provides further evi-
dence as to the unpreparedness of both the nation 
state and the UN in responding to the disaster. The 
UN’s failure to respond adequately to the event 
until a week after the earthquake is attributable to 
India’s previous predilection of responding to di-
sasters internally. The subsequent failure of the UN 
to provide a sufficiently equipped and adequately 
staffed team cannot, however, be attributed to this 
short-coming. This provides further support for 
the view that the UN was underprepared. This 
under preparedness shown by the UN, states, and 
other aid agencies led to significant issues during 
the early phases of the crisis, perhaps the most 
detrimental being the lack of coordination. The 
early stages of a relief effort are widely regarded 
as some of the most important; effective distribu-
tion of medical supplies, clean water, shelter and 
food at this time can be the difference between 
life and death for many. Proactive preparation 
for such situations should be a driver for change 
within the UN.
Systems and Communications
The failure of aid agencies to adopt widely ac-
cepted, compatible systems has contributed to 
major problems with information flow across 
the three case studies. In Haiti, the failure to 
back-up systems which had been in place prior to 
the disaster meant that essential information was 
lost which could have been vital to early stages 
of relief. This issue was further exaggerated by 
the UN’s failure to employ an adequate number 
of staff and resources in the development of 
information management. As a result, delays in 
collecting and sharing information became ap-
parent. Criticisms were also leveled at other aid 
agencies for their failure to prioritise the need 
for information exchange. This may have been 
as a result of incompatible systems, or a lack of 
experience among agencies.
Systems used by the UN during the tsunami also 
encountered a great deal of criticism, mainly due 
to their bureaucratic and user-unfriendly nature. 
Evidence has been provided which suggests the 
systems employed were chronically unsuitable for 
purpose and that there is a need for a complete 
overhaul in the systems used. However, there is 
also a requirement for better methods of data col-
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lection and analysis to be implemented in order 
to make any new system successful. During the 
Gujarat earthquake there were complaints that, 
although information flow was successful during 
the early phases of the relief effort, future flow 
was disrupted by the UN’s failure to empower us-
ers. Also, complaints were once again raised with 
regard to the user unfriendliness of the systems.
The effects of poor and disparate systems and 
the failure of aid agencies to prioritise any need to 
share information had far reaching effects across 
the three case studies. Inaccessible and reduced 
flow of information during the relief efforts caused 
problems in coordinating an effective response 
and keeping aid agencies informed of the latest 
developments: the knock-on effect of which was 
duplication of effort and difficulties in tracking 
the distribution of aid and supplies. Furthermore, 
this led to immense difficulty in monitoring and 
evaluating performance.
Lack of Collaboration 
and Transparency
Collaboration from agency to agency, and govern-
ment to agency, provided significant impediments 
to effective relief efforts. In addition, the lack of 
transparency displayed by some agencies further 
hampered the opportunity to share information. 
Some of the major criticisms leveled at the UN 
have surrounded their failure to actively collabo-
rate with governments, other agencies, and even 
among their own departments. The result of this 
has been a failure on the UN’s part to gather vital 
information from governments and other agencies, 
prompting accusations that some aid agencies have 
been allowed to act on their own recognizance. 
Furthermore, some aid agencies have as a result 
failed to engage with the UN in any way.
A lack of collaboration with the disaster af-
fected populations, particularly during the rede-
velopment phase, has resulted in accusations of 
arrogance and thus populations being unhappy 
with the results. The level of transparency shown 
by some agencies has also been called into question 
(Murphy, 2010). This has led to some aid agencies 
refusing to accept external help and security issues 
during the delivery of aid. It is important to note 
that aid agencies are not completely responsible 
for the lack of collaboration; state governments 
have also been guilty of failing to engage and 
demonstrate sufficient transparency. This has 
been evidenced by the deliberate overestimation 
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in refugee 
camps in order to gain access to greater levels of 
aid. In addition, as witnessed during the Gujarat 
earthquake, the Indian government’s reluctance to 
disseminate information hampered relief efforts 
with the resultant effects of failing to collaborate 
once again manifested in a lack of coordination 
between agencies. This in turn led to some agencies 
acting independently, outside of the jurisdiction 
of either the UN or the state government. Some 
agencies felt forced into forming disparate com-
munities, resulting in conflicting directions being 
given and supplies failing to be delivered.
Proliferation and Inexperience 
of Aid Agencies
One trend witnessed during all three of the case 
studies analyzed has been the mass proliferation 
of aid agencies, and in particular NGOs, who at-
tended the relief effort. This has been mirrored by 
the number of NGOs now in operation around the 
globe. Despite the undoubted good intentions of 
NGOs, both new and old, the inexperience of some 
has caused problems during the aid effort. This 
has been witnessed by a failure to collaborate, an 
unawareness of protocols, and failure in reporting 
to governing bodies. In one extreme case there was 
the example of the American Baptist Church being 
accused of kidnapping Haitian orphans. However, 
apportioning blame solely towards NGOs is not 
necessarily justified; lack of leadership and good 
governance must also be addressed.
The effects of NGO inexperience and mass 
proliferation again bred difficulties in establishing 
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a sufficient level of coordination. The attendance 
of over four hundred NGOs to the Haitian earth-
quake would make coordination difficult in any 
circumstance, and particularly when a host of 
inexperienced NGOs are involved. This situation 
can be further exaggerated when good governance 
and leadership are absent. As a result significant 
issues were recorded in terms of information flow, 
reporting, monitoring and evaluation.
Organizational and State Culture
The culture of an organization or state is typically 
something which is deeply ingrained, particularly 
in well established organizations within strongly 
independent countries. The results of cultural dif-
ferences in the three case studies are widely visible. 
It is noticeable that a number of aid agencies have 
refused to work with other organizations and as 
such have been reluctant to share any information. 
This also leads to the issue of strategic visions 
becoming disparate and some organizations having 
different goals which may contradict or disrupt 
the entire process. There are accusations that the 
UN themselves have been guilty of developing 
an ‘elitist’ culture which has resulted in some 
NGOs viewing them with suspicion and as being 
unreliable in their ability to oversee the aid effort. 
Questions have also been asked about integrity, 
embraced as a core competency, within the UN 
(Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2004).
Furthermore, there are reports that the various 
UN departments have been viewed as being a group 
of disparate agencies rather than one enterprise 
focused upon on a shared vision (Olara, 2009). 
This has resulted in failure to adequately share 
information between departments. Additionally, 
centralized decision-making and failures to em-
power staff in the field have provoked further is-
sues. As such we can decipher that the UN is some 
way from becoming a learning organization. The 
problems of state culture have also been apparent 
in the case studies analyzed. Reports of the Indian 
government refusing to allow access to the Anda-
man Islands following the tsunami due to military 
sensitivity highlight this problem. There have also 
been reports of some states refusing to accept aid 
from certain foreign countries. One positive note 
relating to the culture of certain organizations has 
been the example, during the tsunami, of Islamic 
and Western agencies working in unison. Due 
to well publicized reasons cooperation has not 
always been evident.
The major effect associated with disparate 
cultures is the difficulty in establishing working 
relationships. This can lead to agencies being 
unwilling to share information and work in part-
nership with other organizations. As such, the 
entire aid mission can be compromised as goals 
and strategies begin to contrast. This can lead 
to problems in establishing a mission strategy 
by which all aid agencies abide, significantly 
hampering the aid process. Some organizational 
cultures have also dictated that there is a regular 
turnover of staff both organizationally and by 
crisis situation. As such, knowledge of processes, 
procedures and expertise is lost from the business. 
The work of agencies can become unregulated due 
to a culture of operating secretly which may lead 
to duplication of effort. Once again the problem 
of coordinating a response is compromised by an 
ingrained culture.
Language Barrier
The language barrier between agencies and af-
fected populations can provide a considerable 
hurdle to successful crisis management. In Haiti 
where the majority of the population is French 
speaking there is reliance upon aid agencies to 
dispatch staff fluent in the language. However, this 
is not always possible due to the resources available 
to many organizations. In the other case studies 
analyzed it is easy to imagine this situation being 
further exacerbated due to the increased number of 
languages spoken, predominantly in the tsunami 
example. The effects that a language barrier can 
create include difficulties in communication be-
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tween agencies and populations. Therefore the 
problem of developing a system with a common 
language runs the risk of alienating some NGOs.
Donor Stipulations and 
Aid Distribution
The Haiti case study has provided evidence that 
distribution of aid is not being entirely used to 
encourage development within the affected area. 
Reports suggest that a percentage of the aid being 
donated has been redistributed to NGOs’ command 
locations in order to finance the employment of 
highly-paid consultants; essential aid has been 
lost by those who need it most. Donor stipulations 
can have a major effect on the way in which aid 
agencies operate, in particular NGOs. The Gujarat 
case study has shown that some aid agencies have 
been attracted to high profile disasters whilst di-
sasters with less press coverage have been largely 
ignored. This has resulted in accusations of aid 
agencies using high-profile disasters in order to 
boost their own public image.
There have also been examples of high-budget 
NGOs being disingenuous to coordination of ef-
forts in conjunction with other agencies. This may 
be due to the fact that the high level of finance 
available to them enables them to undertake and 
employ sufficient staff to manage an entire project 
single-handedly. In terms of the distribution of aid 
many of the problems have been linked to the dif-
ficulties in tracking its supply and in some cases 
aid was delivered to the same area twice. In order 
to combat this problem the UN has developed two 
new systems which have largely been proven to 
be successful during the tsunami aid distribution. 
Accusations have also become apparent that aid 
has only targeted certain demographics and largely 
ignored others. This goes against the mandates of 
many aid agencies that aid should be delivered 
regardless of age, race, gender or social standing.
The effect of aid agencies failing to engage 
with other organizations leads to monumental 
problems. Once again the issue of duplicated ef-
forts comes to the fore as independent organiza-
tions fail to notify others of their achievements. 
In terms of aid distribution, without suitable 
systems in place and sufficient information shar-
ing, there is considerable scope for aid deliveries 
being repeated and certain areas in need being 
overlooked. In addition, tracking the finance and 
available supplies becomes very difficult.
Agency Relations
Relations between agencies are fluid and regularly 
need to adapt and change in accordance with the 
situation. Serious dysfunction was witnessed 
between the UN and other aid agencies during 
the Gujarat earthquake, and indeed between UN 
departments. The tsunami provided an example 
instance of an NGO with a great deal of financial 
backing attempting to subcontract work to the UN. 
The continued growth of NGOs and the example 
mentioned set a dangerous precedent for the UN 
whilst threatening to compromise their position 
as a leading body. As such there may be scope 
for the UN to look to re-evaluate their position 
in the aid agency hierarchy in order to reaffirm 
their status as a leading body.
The possible effect of poor relations threatens 
to further complicate the coordination of aid agen-
cies. The Gujarat earthquake provided the UN with 
an exemplar as to the threats poor relations can 
pose; some NGOs broke away to form disparate 
communities. The importance of establishing 
long-standing and trustworthy partnerships is vital, 
particularly in an age when the number of NGOs 
continues to increase. The blurring of the UN’s 
standing threatens to create further problems. The 
UN is currently regarded by many as a leading 
body in crisis management; allowing agencies 
to dictate terms to the UN could undermine their 
position of leadership and ownership in crisis 
situations. To summarize the severity of enumer-
ated knowledge-based issues, a severity score is 
associated with each of these factors in the cases 
discussed earlier as shown in Figure 3. A total of 
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these scores provides a cumulative severity index 
for these impediments. For the said cases, leader-
ship, systems and communications, collaboration 
and transparency, under preparedness, and lack 
of trust provide the largest impediments, closely 
followed by ownership, inexperience, and culture. 
Due to the fact that lack of leadership, trust and 
ownership play a vital role in any crisis situa-
tion, and are mainly associated with a cascading 
effect on other factors, Figure 3 shows them as 
separate entities for more emphasis. The remain-
ing attributes are coupled together to provide a 
consolidated score. The scale used to categorise 
the severity is as follows:
• 5: Cause is highly apparent
• 3: Cause is moderately apparent
• 1: Cause is apparent
Assigning the severity rating for each of the 
factors has been accomplished through a qualita-
tive analysis of the case.
APPLICATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT CONSTRUCTS
The incorporation and effective use of Knowledge 
Management (KM) could help aid agencies in 
overcoming many of the issues which they cur-
rently face. However, before KM can become a 
fundamental aspect of crisis management within 
aid agencies, there is a pressing need to overcome 
the current causes of issues and impediments to 
KM which currently exist (Immonen et al., 2009). 
Only by making changes at each stage of the cur-
rent processes can KM become a truly worthwhile 
venture. There is an urgent requirement for making 
provisions to encourage greater information shar-
ing, collaboration, leadership, and transparency 
among aid agencies. An industry-wide acceptance 
of KM could help achieve this. KM has bore wit-
ness to some outstanding achievements in recent 
years and has helped to make significant progress 
in the world of healthcare. The result has been that 
KM is now valued as a key corporate resource 
by many global organizations (Bali et al., 2009). 
Figure 3. Severity of impediments for each of the cases
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The effective use of KM in crisis management 
can help to retain expertise, train new employees, 
and analyze and disseminate vital statistics and 
information to operatives working in the field 
(Wickramasinghe & Bali, 2008). Figure 4 illus-
trates the current status of the Crisis Management 
cycle and the impediments which exist.
Figure 4 depicts the cycle of impediments from 
one crisis management situation to another. If we 
take the upper circle (under preparedness) to be 
the start of a new crisis management situation the 
diagram reads as follows:
• A lack of preparedness for the new 
situation.
• Resultant delay in establishing effective 
leadership or ownership.
• Collaboration, relations, and transparency 
issues come to the fore which results in 
inexperienced agencies being left to their 
own devices.
• Lack of meaningful data being collected 
and analyzed - meaning that systems re-
main poor, disparate, individual to the or-
ganization, and with no scope for knowl-
edge sharing.
• Ultimate failure to record information re-
sulting in agencies being unable to reuse 
information and apply it to a new scenario 
or for training purposes (the cycle begins 
again with the same disparities apparent in 
the new crisis).
Well executed KM initiatives to improve this 
cycle offer many benefits which could be reaped 
by aid agencies during the management of crisis 
situations. Such benefits include:
• Establishment of better working 
relationships.
• Reduction in organizational 
competitiveness.
• Increased transparency.
• Identification of the UN as a strong lead-
er, therefore negating fears over agency 
concerns.
Figure 4. The “Circle of Impediments”
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• Improved performance measurement.
• Establish a shared vision.
• Strengthen partnerships.
• Increase coordination and reduce dupli-
cated efforts.
• Increase information flow.
Successful KM can only be achieved if all 
actors embrace the process. It is imperative that 
the UN plays a key role in driving this change. 
However, as the case studies have evidenced, the 
UN incorporates its own issues when it comes 
to knowledge-sharing within departments. As a 
result, one of the fundamentals of aid agencies 
embracing KM must begin with the UN becom-
ing a knowledge-based “Learning Organization” 
(Bali et al., 2009). Schematically, such changes 
improve the “Circle of impediments” to a KM-
enabled “Circle of Trust” (see Figure 5).
CONCLUSION
Figure 2 captures the current management state 
of the crisis and provides a perspective on how 
impediments can occur in crisis situation, addi-
tionally highlighted by analysis of the cases. Such 
impediments result in widening the knowledge 
gaps between stakeholders (IGOs, NGOs and 
states) and, in turn, lead to undesirable and chaotic 
crisis management. Many of the problems which 
aid agencies have experienced in their attempts 
to facilitate successful crisis management have 
been as a result of similar factors, regardless of 
the situation. Therefore, the failure to learn from 
these mistakes and to implement measures to 
prevent their reoccurrence is unacceptable, and 
necessitates an urgent response to the problem. 
Lessons learned from each disaster and exercise 
need to be captured and disseminated to those 
responsible for creating formal or ad hoc emer-
Figure 5. The “Circle of Trust”
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gency response systems (Murphy & Jennex, 2006). 
The recent success of knowledge management in 
the healthcare industry and corporate world has 
prompted questions as to the benefits which it could 
bring to crisis management. These benefits could 
include improved information sharing, greater 
teamwork, better preparedness, reduced duplica-
tion of efforts and increased coordination. All of 
these benefits would to some extent reduce the 
recurring issues which have been witnessed across 
recent crisis management situations. However, a 
number of impediments need to be broken down 
and studied to identify their root cause before a 
knowledge-based solution can be developed for 
crisis management.
The UN has largely accepted that knowledge-
based solutions should become the core of their 
operations. Yet their initial efforts to achieve this 
have been met with a less than encouraging re-
sponse. It is imperative that the UN focuses upon 
efforts to become a learning organization and 
implement knowledge-based solutions effectively. 
When such KM-based tools and techniques are 
integrated into the UN’s management of crisis 
situations, they should facilitate crisis management 
working at level 4 (see Figure 2). As a result the 
benefits and subsequent effects on other agencies 
could change and improve the way crisis manage-
ment is delivered globally.
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